PROGRAMME OF EVENTS.
19 June
9.30-10.00: Welcome & Coffee
10.00-11.15: Plenary Session
Professor Krista Thomason (Swarthmore): "In defence of vengeful anger"
Vengeful anger has a particularly bad reputation. Adages and proverbs warn that desiring revenge “digs two graves” and that an “eye for an eye” leaves everyone blind. We characterize the vengeful person as too quick to anger, as taking slights too seriously, and as holding grudges she should let go. Additionally, vengeful anger supposedly betrays morally problematic views of other people. To seek retaliation is to view the offender as a villain or enemy to be destroyed and to enjoy her suffering at the moment of revenge. Yet as often as vengeful anger is derided and lamented, we seem loath to give it up. Revenge tales in books and films are popular and satisfying. Further, philosophers and legal scholars have long noted the close connection vengeful anger bears to justice. The idea that a wrongdoer ought to pay for his crimes or “get what’s coming to him” is at the heart of both the desire to see justice done and the desire for revenge. In this paper, I offer a defense of vengeful anger. In particular, I will argue that the wish for payback that is central to vengeful anger is neither irrational nor vicious. At the core vengeful anger is a wish or desire for what I will call forced empathy. Contrary to the claim that the payback wish is an irrational desire to turn back time or a simple desire to hurt the wrongdoer, I argue that payback is a wish that the wrongdoer be forced to appreciate how her actions affected the victim. I then examine the appropriateness of the role of vengeful anger in punishment.
11.15-12.15: Parallel Sessions
12.15-13.15: Lunch
13.15-14.30: Plenary Session
Professor Kimberley Brownlee (Warwick): "A hope standard for punishment"
Each year, approximately 100 people, including dozens of young people, take their own life while they are in a UK prison. Thousands of people either engage in self-harm or abuse other prisoners. Such behaviours often correlate with mental health struggles, but also, often, are pleas for help and hope. This paper considers what role hope should play within our practices of lawful punishment. The paper argues that one standard that a given punishment must meet in order to be legitimate and morally justifiable is that it be compatible with a reasonable person retaining hope for her future after punishment.
14.30-15.30: Parallel Sessions
15.30-16.00: Coffee
16.00-17.00: Parallel Sessions
17.00-18.15: Plenary Session
Professor Michael Brady (Glasgow): "Suffering and punishment"
In this presentation I offer a defence of the Communicative Theory of Punishment against recent criticisms due to Matt Matravers. According to the Communicative Theory, the intentional imposition of suffering by the judiciary is justified because it is intrinsic to the condemnation and censure that an offender deserves as a result of wrongdoing. Matravers raises a number of worries about this idea – grounded in his thought that suffering isn’t necessary for censure, and as a consequence sometimes the imposition of suffering can be unjust. I respond by arguing that the imposition of suffering is an essential part of a suite of emotional responses that wrongdoing merits. Words are not enough for censure and condemnation.
18.15-19.15: Drinks reception
19.30: Conference dinner
20 June
10.00-11.00: Parallel Sessions
11.00-11.30: Coffee
11.30-12.45: Plenary Session
Professor Sabine Roeser (TU Delft): "Punishment and sympathy in times of 'bubbles'"
Public debates about controversial technological and scientific developments such as climate change, vaccination and genetic modification are frequently heated and end up in stalemates. This is due to the scientific and moral complexities of these risks, which lead to strong emotional responses by people. The way emotions are typically treated in debates increase estrangement and polarization. People from different ‘bubbles’ blame each other for seeing the world in an irrational and lopsided way. In my presentation, I will argue that this is due to a misunderstanding of emotions. Rather than seeing emotions as irrational states, I argue that emotions can contribute to emotional-moral reflection and public deliberation on technological risks. I will argue that emotions are crucial to debates about technological risks, because emotions can point out what morally matters. Conventional, quantitative approaches leave out important ethical considerations such as justice, fairness, autonomy and legitimacy. Addressing emotions in a different way can help to overcome stalemates: by focusing on what unites us rather than what divides us, emotions can contribute to sympathy and understanding of shared values, which can in turn contribute to finding commonly shared solutions. However, these insights are challenged by developments on social media, where polarization and venting of anger, blame and extreme viewpoints seem to dominate, as compared to understanding, forgiveness and finding common ground, so different platforms for deliberation are needed.
12.45-13.45: Lunch
13.45-14.45: Parallel Sessions
14.45-16.00: Plenary Session
Dr Mary Carman (Wits University): "Moving between frustration and anger: Punishing, empowering, but not trusting"
Anger has been widely defended as an emotion that can have political and moral value. While it may be a punishing emotion – in our own experiences and for those we are angry with – there are good arguments to think that it can nevertheless be an empowering one. Yet, many cases of political anger arise out of frustration, particularly frustration in response to a lack of change. That frustration can move into anger after some catalysing event, then revert to frustration. Take, for instance, the recurring student protests in South Africa since 2015 against the lack of access to tertiary education in the country. This can be seen as frustration at a perceived lack of political will to bring about meaningful change in pursuit of justice, but which flares into anger after a catalysing event, such as the financial exclusion of returning students from impoverished families in 2019. After emotion-fuelled protests and still no substantial change, the anger simmers down but frustration remains. Frustration, however, is not open to the same kinds of philosophical defences that are available for anger: where anger can be punishing but empowering, frustration is plausibly only punishing. Can we learn anything by highlighting the role of frustration in many cases of political anger? In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of frustration as a political emotion and argue that the movement between frustration and anger (and back) draws out the centrality of a break-down of trusting that can get lost if one only focuses on anger. Reframing the frustration-anger movement within a context of trusting potentially has implications for how we respond to – indeed, if we punish – the associated anger and expressions of that anger.
16.00-16.30: Coffee
16.30-17.30: Symposium
17.30: End of Conference & Farewells
19 June
9.30-10.00: Welcome & Coffee
10.00-11.15: Plenary Session
Professor Krista Thomason (Swarthmore): "In defence of vengeful anger"
Vengeful anger has a particularly bad reputation. Adages and proverbs warn that desiring revenge “digs two graves” and that an “eye for an eye” leaves everyone blind. We characterize the vengeful person as too quick to anger, as taking slights too seriously, and as holding grudges she should let go. Additionally, vengeful anger supposedly betrays morally problematic views of other people. To seek retaliation is to view the offender as a villain or enemy to be destroyed and to enjoy her suffering at the moment of revenge. Yet as often as vengeful anger is derided and lamented, we seem loath to give it up. Revenge tales in books and films are popular and satisfying. Further, philosophers and legal scholars have long noted the close connection vengeful anger bears to justice. The idea that a wrongdoer ought to pay for his crimes or “get what’s coming to him” is at the heart of both the desire to see justice done and the desire for revenge. In this paper, I offer a defense of vengeful anger. In particular, I will argue that the wish for payback that is central to vengeful anger is neither irrational nor vicious. At the core vengeful anger is a wish or desire for what I will call forced empathy. Contrary to the claim that the payback wish is an irrational desire to turn back time or a simple desire to hurt the wrongdoer, I argue that payback is a wish that the wrongdoer be forced to appreciate how her actions affected the victim. I then examine the appropriateness of the role of vengeful anger in punishment.
11.15-12.15: Parallel Sessions
- Room 1: Mercedes Corredor (Michigan): "Policing unintentional slights: bad sex and moral disapproval"
- Room 2: Costanza Porro (KCL): "State blame for criminal wrongdoing: a skeptical view"
12.15-13.15: Lunch
13.15-14.30: Plenary Session
Professor Kimberley Brownlee (Warwick): "A hope standard for punishment"
Each year, approximately 100 people, including dozens of young people, take their own life while they are in a UK prison. Thousands of people either engage in self-harm or abuse other prisoners. Such behaviours often correlate with mental health struggles, but also, often, are pleas for help and hope. This paper considers what role hope should play within our practices of lawful punishment. The paper argues that one standard that a given punishment must meet in order to be legitimate and morally justifiable is that it be compatible with a reasonable person retaining hope for her future after punishment.
14.30-15.30: Parallel Sessions
- Room 1: Daniel Telech and Leora Dahan Katz (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Polonsky Academy): "Punitive disappointment"
- Room 2: Jake Wojtowicz (KCL): "Agent-regret and punishment"
15.30-16.00: Coffee
16.00-17.00: Parallel Sessions
- Room 1: Manuela Irarrázabal (UCL): "Punishment, pleasure, and pain in Greek tragedy"
- Room 2: Andreas Carlsson (Oslo): "Guilt, blameworthiness, and the point of blame"
17.00-18.15: Plenary Session
Professor Michael Brady (Glasgow): "Suffering and punishment"
In this presentation I offer a defence of the Communicative Theory of Punishment against recent criticisms due to Matt Matravers. According to the Communicative Theory, the intentional imposition of suffering by the judiciary is justified because it is intrinsic to the condemnation and censure that an offender deserves as a result of wrongdoing. Matravers raises a number of worries about this idea – grounded in his thought that suffering isn’t necessary for censure, and as a consequence sometimes the imposition of suffering can be unjust. I respond by arguing that the imposition of suffering is an essential part of a suite of emotional responses that wrongdoing merits. Words are not enough for censure and condemnation.
18.15-19.15: Drinks reception
19.30: Conference dinner
20 June
10.00-11.00: Parallel Sessions
- Room 1: Craig Agule (Rutgers): "Being sympathetic to bad-history wrongdoers"
- Room 2: Aleksandra Świderska (Warsaw) "The benefit of looking harmed: Injured robots may appear more human-like and less uncanny"
11.00-11.30: Coffee
11.30-12.45: Plenary Session
Professor Sabine Roeser (TU Delft): "Punishment and sympathy in times of 'bubbles'"
Public debates about controversial technological and scientific developments such as climate change, vaccination and genetic modification are frequently heated and end up in stalemates. This is due to the scientific and moral complexities of these risks, which lead to strong emotional responses by people. The way emotions are typically treated in debates increase estrangement and polarization. People from different ‘bubbles’ blame each other for seeing the world in an irrational and lopsided way. In my presentation, I will argue that this is due to a misunderstanding of emotions. Rather than seeing emotions as irrational states, I argue that emotions can contribute to emotional-moral reflection and public deliberation on technological risks. I will argue that emotions are crucial to debates about technological risks, because emotions can point out what morally matters. Conventional, quantitative approaches leave out important ethical considerations such as justice, fairness, autonomy and legitimacy. Addressing emotions in a different way can help to overcome stalemates: by focusing on what unites us rather than what divides us, emotions can contribute to sympathy and understanding of shared values, which can in turn contribute to finding commonly shared solutions. However, these insights are challenged by developments on social media, where polarization and venting of anger, blame and extreme viewpoints seem to dominate, as compared to understanding, forgiveness and finding common ground, so different platforms for deliberation are needed.
12.45-13.45: Lunch
13.45-14.45: Parallel Sessions
- Room 1: Lilith Newton (Edinburgh): "Blameworthiness and punishment for the right reason"
- Room 2: Kirstine la Cour (UCL): "Threats and Protests"
14.45-16.00: Plenary Session
Dr Mary Carman (Wits University): "Moving between frustration and anger: Punishing, empowering, but not trusting"
Anger has been widely defended as an emotion that can have political and moral value. While it may be a punishing emotion – in our own experiences and for those we are angry with – there are good arguments to think that it can nevertheless be an empowering one. Yet, many cases of political anger arise out of frustration, particularly frustration in response to a lack of change. That frustration can move into anger after some catalysing event, then revert to frustration. Take, for instance, the recurring student protests in South Africa since 2015 against the lack of access to tertiary education in the country. This can be seen as frustration at a perceived lack of political will to bring about meaningful change in pursuit of justice, but which flares into anger after a catalysing event, such as the financial exclusion of returning students from impoverished families in 2019. After emotion-fuelled protests and still no substantial change, the anger simmers down but frustration remains. Frustration, however, is not open to the same kinds of philosophical defences that are available for anger: where anger can be punishing but empowering, frustration is plausibly only punishing. Can we learn anything by highlighting the role of frustration in many cases of political anger? In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of frustration as a political emotion and argue that the movement between frustration and anger (and back) draws out the centrality of a break-down of trusting that can get lost if one only focuses on anger. Reframing the frustration-anger movement within a context of trusting potentially has implications for how we respond to – indeed, if we punish – the associated anger and expressions of that anger.
16.00-16.30: Coffee
16.30-17.30: Symposium
17.30: End of Conference & Farewells